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Abstract 
Human factors science can be applied to many different facets of safety management.  There 
are ergonomics issues of equipment design, usability and the layout of working environments; 
processes related to safety management systems (SMS); organisational issues (e.g. cultural 
aspects) and psychological factors pertaining to elements of human performance for 
individuals and work teams. In this chapter, we focus on three of these topics which are inter-
related, namely safety culture, safety leadership and behaviours relating to non-technical 
skills. We present the fundamental aspects of each concept and then discuss applications, with 
specific reference to a) the oil and gas industry and b) healthcare.  
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KEY TERMS 
 
Crew Resource Management (CRM) – training which was developed in aviation, designed to 
encourage aircrews to use all available resources – equipment, people, and information – in order to 
enhance flight safety. 
Non-Technical Skills (NTS) - the cognitive, social and personal resource skills that complement 
technical skills, and contribute to safe and efficient task performance. 
Safety culture - the product of individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies and 
patterns of behaviour that determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an 
organisation’s health and safety management. 
Safety leadership – the behaviours of managers and supervisors that maintain, improve and 
promote the state of workplace safety. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Human factors/ ergonomics (HFE) aspects of safety management are wide-ranging and it is now 
recognised that these are essential for effective risk control, as well as performance efficiencies and 
worker well-being. Traditionally, safety management was mainly concerned with engineering barriers 
(e.g. blast walls, guard rails), personal protection (e.g. hard hats) and devising rules and regulations to 
govern workers’ and managers’ actions.  As accident investigations became more sophisticated, it was 
clear that these techniques alone did not provide sufficient protection and that human and 
organizational factors had to be considered and managed (Reason, 1997; CSB, 2016). The scope of 
human factors science applied to safety encompasses ergonomic issues of equipment design, usability 
and the layout of working environments, processes related to safety management systems (SMS), 
organisational issues (such as cultural aspects) and psychological and physiological effects on human 
performance for individuals and work teams. As the subject is extensive, in this chapter, we have 
focused on just three of these safety topic areas which would be of particular interest to the Gulf 
region: i) safety culture, ii) managers’ safety leadership and iii) worker behaviours relating to non-
technical skills (see Figure 1 which indicates how these are related). We discuss these in the context 
of our research in two sectors: healthcare, and the oil and gas industry.  
 
 
Figure 1. Three components of safe job performance discussed in this chapter.  
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FUNDAMENTALS 
Safety Culture 
Analysis of major industrial accidents in the 1980s began to shift regulatory and research focus from 
failures of equipment and of individual workers to an examination of the underlying culture of the 
organisation. This began with the Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster in 1986 where the 
investigators concluded that aspects of the organisational culture had contributed to the accident 
(IAEA, 1986). Nowadays culture frequently features as a causal factor. For example, the review of the 
crash of an RAF Nimrod aircraft in 2006 with 14 deaths, is subtitled: ‘A failure in leadership, culture 
and priorities.’ (Haddon-Cave, 2009). Similarly, a recent report from the American National Academy 
of Sciences (NAS, 2016) emphasised the importance of managing the organisational culture on 
offshore oil and gas installations in order to enhance safety.  
The term safety culture is often used interchangeably with safety climate, but in the academic 
literature these are typically regarded as two distinct concepts (Cox & Flin, 1998). Safety culture is 
defined not only as encompassing safety-related attitudes, behaviours and perceptions but also 
covering deeply rooted values and assumptions that individuals hold about the organisation (Pettita, 
Probst, Barbaranelli, & Ghezzi, 2017).  On the other hand, safety climate is proposed to be a surface 
manifestation (Schein, 1990), a ‘snapshot’ of the existing culture (Mearns, Flin, Gordon & Fleming 
1998). The distinction between the concepts can be crucial: Recent research suggests that certain 
dimensions of safety culture (autocratic and bureaucratic) can undermine the effects of safety climate 
on safety outcomes (Petitta et al, 2017). Given the limited space in this chapter, we use the term 
safety culture to cover both concepts.  
There are different approaches to studying organisational culture and safety outcomes. The most 
common is to talk of an over-arching safety culture which essentially reflects managerial and worker 
attitudes related to the control of risk and the prioritisation of safety. ‘The safety culture of an 
organization is the product of individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies and 
patterns of behaviour that determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an 
organisation’s health and safety management.’ (ACSNI, 1993, p.23). The main dimensions of 
organisational safety culture typically include: management commitment to safety, work practices, 
relative prioritisation of safety, adherence to safety rules, risk management, reporting of errors and 
incidents.  
A second approach emphasises subcomponents that are types of culture. For instance, Reason (1997, 
p195) suggested that a safety culture had elements which were: an ‘informed’ culture – knowing 
about all the factors that influence the safety of the system; a ‘reporting’ culture - that encourages 
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telling about incidents; a ‘just’ culture - where employees believe they are treated fairly and will not 
be inappropriately blamed for errors; a ‘flexible’  culture that  favours a flatter structure; a ‘learning’ 
culture that is willing to draw appropriate conclusions and act on them. Dekker (2016) provides a 
detailed account of why a just culture, which he describes as a culture of trust, learning and 
accountability is particularly important for safety management. Thirdly, safety culture maturity 
models (based on Westrum, 1995) have been devised, which characterise a staged evolution from a 
pathological culture which does not pay attention to safety, through to a very safety-conscious 
‘generative’ culture (Fleming 2000; Goncalves et al, 2010; Parker et al, 2006).  
Whichever framework is adopted, the safety culture is of interest because it essentially influences 
what become the normal workplace behaviours in relation to safety, such as taking risks, following 
rules, speaking up about safety concerns, reporting accidents and errors. Essentially, organisations 
need to maintain a culture which makes it ‘easy to do the right thing, and hard to do the wrong thing’ 
for safety. The safety culture is normally measured by questionnaires which assesses workforce 
perceptions of the dimensions (e.g. supervisor support for safety) and their associated behaviours 
(e.g. willingness to report incidents). 
Across industries, safety culture has been shown to be a robust predictor of both workers’ safety 
behaviours and objective safety outcomes, such as injury and accident rates. Worksites with more 
positive cultures show lower accident rates, workers who perceive their supervisor/manager to be 
more committed to safety engage in more safety-related behaviour and fewer risk-taking behaviours   
(Clarke, 2010; Probst & Estrada, 2010; Zohar, 2014). In a meta-analyses based on different industrial 
settings, safety climate was shown to influence employees’ safety behaviours through its effects on 
safety knowledge and motivation (Christian, et al., 2009). The motivational mechanism linking culture 
to behaviour is likely to be a function of expectations, that is, whether workers expect to be rewarded 
or reprimanded for particular actions related to safety and production (Zohar, 2014). Again this 
indicated the important role of managers and supervisors in creating expectations that will affect 
workers’ behaviour choices.  Later, the roles of safety climate acting as a source for employees’ safety 
motivation and knowledge, as well as a predictor of employees’ safety behaviours, were validated 
across cultures in both English and non-English speaking countries (Barbarabelli, Pettita, & Probst, 
2015). 
Following the Piper Alpha accident in 1988, studies of safety culture were conducted on offshore 
installations in the North Sea (Mearns et al, 1998; 2001; Rundmo, 1992). These portrayed the key 
cultural features showing that management and supervisor commitment to safety were particularly 
important for building safer norms of behaviour. A study comparing offshore installations across the 
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Norwegian and UK sectors showed that there were more differences among companies than between 
the two nationalities (Mearns et al, 2004).  
In healthcare, interest in measuring safety culture emerged after the high rates of adverse events 
suffered by patients were revealed (Vincent, 2010) therefore the focus has usually been on features 
of the safety culture in hospitals that protects patients from errors and harm. Fan et al (2016) found 
an association between safety culture scores and surgical site infections. A study of intensive care 
units revealed an association between poorer safety culture scores and increased length of stay for 
patients, as well as a link between less favourable perceptions of management and higher mortality 
rates (Huang et al. 2010).  
The relationships between safety culture and healthcare workers’ wellbeing have also been assessed. 
In a study with nurses, negative associations were found between unit level safety culture scores and 
workers’ back injuries, as well as with patient urinary tract infections and medication errors (Hofmann 
& Mark 2006). Similarly, Gimeno et al. (2005) found that safety culture was related to self- reported 
work-related injuries. Blood and body fluid exposure incidents for workers were lower when senior 
management support, safety feedback and training were perceived favourably (Gershon et al. 2000). 
Zohar et al. (2007) showed both group and hospital level culture as predictors of future safety 
behaviours.  
As mentioned above, one of the most influential safety culture dimensions is leadership quality 
(Nahrgang, Morgeson & Hoffman, 2011), with managerial commitment to safety emerging as the most 
robust predictor of future incidents (Beus, et al., 2010). We consider managers’ and supervisors’ 
Safety Leadership in the next section.  
Safety Leadership  
For effective safety management, leadership is important at every level of management, from team 
leaders, to site managers, to top-level managers. Most research on managerial leadership concerns 
productivity (Yukl, 2013), but there is now an increasing interest in the relationship of leadership styles 
to safety outcomes (e.g. Agnew et al, 2014a; Hofmann & Morgeson, 2004). Particular styles of 
leadership are associated with better safety behaviours by workers (e.g. compliance to rules) and 
more favourable organisational safety performance, such as decreased accident rates.  
The model most often applied to the study of managers’ safety leadership is the transactional/ 
transformational model (Bass 1998). The transactional component involves the leader offering 
incentives and/ or punishments that are contingent on the subordinate's performance meeting agreed 
standards. Bass argued that this transactional relationship, at best, produces expected performance 
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levels, because it only appeals to individual goals and aspirations. While all leaders use the 
transactional component, he showed that leaders of the highest performing teams also display 
transformational behaviours. Transformational leaders are charismatic, inspiring, stimulating, and 
considerate. They provide followers with a sense of purpose; portray an image of success, self-
confidence and self-belief; articulate shared goals and question traditional assumptions, while taking 
into account the needs of subordinates. Clarke (2013) conducted a meta-analysis on transactional/ 
transformational leadership and safety outcomes. The findings demonstrated the crucial role of both 
leadership styles to predict the safety behaviours of the workers. For example, active transactional 
leadership such as anticipating problems and taking proactive actions were strongly associated with 
workers’ compliance with the organisation’s safety rules and regulations. On the other hand, 
transformational style was a better predictor of safety participation behaviours of the workers.  The 
related theory of authentic leadership (Avolio & Gardner, 2005) has also been applied in safety 
research (e.g. Nielsen et al, 2013) indicating that this style can also be effective.  
Although leadership practices as a predictor of safety outcomes are well documented, Yukl (2013) 
pointed out that the level of management has to be taken into account. Top managers may have more 
of an influence on rule-related behaviours whereas supervisors may be better at encouraging 
voluntary activities that are related to safety (Clarke & Ward, 2006). Zohar and Luria (2005) identified 
supervisors as better than senior managers at influencing workers’ safety behaviours.  
Supervisory safety practices have been found to decrease the number of minor accidents and 
positively influence workers’ safety climate perceptions. Transformational leadership behaviours of 
supervisors were related to fewer occupational injuries (Zohar, 2002). The literature on supervisors 
and safety emphasises the importance of good communication, the need to build trust and to care 
about the team members, as well as setting and reinforcing safety standards, especially when there 
are strong production or cost reduction goals (Hofmann & Morgenson, 2004). Therefore, relying solely 
on the written safety rules might not ensure an increase in voluntary safety activities of the workers. 
Rather, supporting and providing training for supervisors on specific leader behaviours to improve 
their leadership styles might yield more desirable safety-related outcomes.  
Safety leadership behaviours of supervisors (Fleming, 1996) and managers (O’Dea & Flin, 1991) on 
offshore installations have been investigated showing the importance of both transactional and 
transformational behaviours. More recently, Nielsen et al (2016) in a time-lagged study of Norwegian 
offshore workers found that constructive leadership emerged as the only significant predictor of 
subsequent psychological safety climate.  
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An investigation into patient safety in a healthcare organisation in England (Healthcare Commission, 
2009) revealed that failure of the senior management’s leadership was one of the factors contributing 
to high mortality rates. In a study of surgery in the USA, the team leader’s behaviours were shown to 
influence team members’ willingness to speak up (Edmondson, 2003).   
While both safety culture and safety leadership can create supportive conditions for safe working 
practices, it is also necessary to consider the skills of the workforce and how these can relate to job 
performance, errors and accidents (as shown in Figure 1).   
 
Non-technical skills 
The term ‘non-technical skills’ (NTS) was first used by the European civil aviation regulator in relation 
to airline pilots' behaviour on the flight deck. NTS can be defined as “the cognitive, social and personal 
resource skills that complement technical skills, and contribute to safe and efficient task performance” 
(Flin et al, 2008, p. 1). It is not only in aviation where these skills contribute to workplace safety, 
studies of accidents in other industries reveal similar patterns. Today Crew Resource Management 
(CRM i.e. non-technical) skills training is used as part of safety management and skills development in 
the maritime industry, rail, nuclear power production, mining, and the emergency services.   
In essence, the non-technical skills enhance workers' technical skills. As Figure 2 shows, poor NTS can 
increase the chance of error, which in turn can increase the chance of an adverse event. Good NTS 
(e.g., high vigilance, clear communication and team coordination) can reduce the likelihood of error 
and consequently of accidents. 
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Figure 2: Relationship between non-technical skills and adverse events  
(Flin et al, 2008, Fig 1.2, Ashgate. Reprinted with permission of Taylor and Francis). 
 
 
 
 
 
The aviation industry had realised by 1980, from a series of accidents with no primary technical failure, 
that maintaining high standards of safety was going to require attention to the pilots’ behaviours that 
could diminish or enhance flight safety (Kanki et al, 2010). From interviews, experiments and accident 
analysis the behaviours that contributed to accidents or were effective in preventing them were 
extracted. A key source of information was the cockpit voice recorder which enabled analysis of the 
pilots’ conversations prior to an accident. The identified behaviours were classified into categories of 
non-technical skills and a special training course for pilots was devised called Crew Resource 
Management (CRM). This was designed to increase the pilots’ understanding of the importance of 
particular behaviours for safety and to provide opportunities to practise the non-technical skills in 
exercises and simulated flights (CAA 2016). The non-technical skills are assessed alongside technical 
skills as part of licensing requirements for pilots (Flin, 2019).  
The main categories of non-technical skills are similar, although not identical, for operational jobs in 
higher risk work settings. Each category can be subdivided into constituent elements and for each 
element, examples of good and poor behaviours (behavioural markers) can be specified. A typical set 
of non-technical skills (described in Flin et al, 2008) is shown below in Table 1.  
 
Poor non-
technical skills 
Good non-
technical skills 
Error 
Avoid/ 
capture error 
Adverse event 
Identify non-
technical skills for 
training and 
assessment 
 
 
Analyse 
adverse events 
Increased chance 
Decreased chance 
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Table 1 Examples of categories and elements in a generic non-technical skills framework 
 
  
Categories Definitions Typical Elements 
Situation awareness Developing a dynamic awareness of the 
situation during a task, based on 
assembling data from the environment, 
understanding what it means and 
anticipating future developments. 
• Gathering information 
• Comprehending (forming a 
mental picture) 
• Anticipating (thinking 
ahead) 
Decision making Determining possible courses of action 
(options) to deal with the assessed 
situation; reaching a judgement in order 
to choose an appropriate course of 
action; implementing the chosen option 
and reviewing its effect. 
• Generating one or more 
options 
• Evaluating options  
• Selecting and 
implementing option  
• Reviewing  
Teamwork Skills for working in a team context to 
ensure that the team has an acceptable 
shared picture of the situation and can 
complete tasks effectively. 
• Co-ordinating actions  
• Resolving conflicts 
• Sharing information 
• Helping others 
Leadership1 Leading the team and providing 
direction, demonstrating high standards 
of practice and care, and being 
considerate about the needs of 
individual team members. 
• Setting and maintaining 
standards 
• Monitoring progress 
• Supporting others 
• Allocating tasks 
 
Managing Personal 
Resources (e.g. stress 
and fatigue) 
Skills for diagnosing one’s state of 
mental and physical fitness for the task; 
taking action to maintain the necessary 
level of fitness or to find an alternative 
solution.  
• Identifying causes of 
stress and fatigue 
• Recognising effects 
• Implementing coping 
strategies 
  
 
Many higher-risk work domains (e.g. ships, mines, hospitals, railways) have adopted a non-technical 
skills approach and introduced Crew Resource Management training. In healthcare, studies are 
beginning to show that the non-technical skills of clinical staff are related to patient outcomes (Hull et 
al 2012).  Analysis of the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig accident have indicated specific failures in non-
technical skills (Reader & O’Connor, 2014; Roberts et al, 2015). A new report on the accident from the 
Chemical Safety Board in the USA (CSB, 2016) - recognises that there is a ‘need for development and 
                                                          
1 Leadership within the discussion of non-technical skills refers to the behaviours of the leader who is co-located 
with his or her team during task execution. Safety Leadership in the previous section refers to the leadership 
style of managers and supervisors who are not directly engaged in the workers’ task execution.   
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use of non-technical skills, including communication, teamwork, and decision making by the operator, 
drilling contractor and other well services providers.’(p24).   
It should be noted that safety culture and safety leadership are important for the maintenance of 
non-technical skills at the worksite (see McCulloch et al, 2009).  
METHODS 
Many sources of information are available on human factors methods for safety management, for 
example books on the design of safe work environments (McLeod, 2015); accident analysis methods 
(Weigmann & Shappell, 2003; Gordon et al 2003); human error (Reason, 1997); data gathering 
techniques (Crandall et al, 2006: Stanton et al, 2013); risk management (Glendon & Clarke, 2015). 
Specialist journals publish reports of studies using human factors techniques to study safety issues 
(e.g. Human Factors; Ergonomics; Safety Science; Journal of Safety Research; Accident Analysis and 
Prevention, Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries; BMJ Quality and Safety). Many 
organisations concerned with safety management have websites with human factors advice e.g.: 
Civil Aviation Authority (CAA, UK) https://www.caa.co.uk/Safety-initiatives-and-resources/Working-
with-industry/Human-factors/Human-factors/ 
Clinical Human Factors Group www.chfg.org 
Energy Institute (UK)  https://www.energyinst.org/technical/human-and-organisational-factors 
Eurocontrol (Air Traffic Management) https://www.eurocontrol.int/tags/human-factors  
Health and Safety Executive (HSE, UK) http://www.hse.gov.uk/humanfactors/index.htm 
 
Methods of measuring safety culture 
Assessing the state of the safety culture requires a baseline assessment of the current level of relevant 
cultural factors in the workplace, so that interventions can be targeted and any subsequent 
improvements can be assessed (Antonsen, 2009). The measurement is normally achieved with a 
questionnaire survey asking workers and managers about their attitudes to safety and perceptions of 
how safety is prioritised and managed in their work unit or across the organization. It may also ask 
respondents to report on their behaviours (e.g. reporting incidents) and to say how many injuries or 
accidents they have suffered or witnessed. There are many safety culture questionnaires available, 
generic instruments such as the HSE safety climate tool (website given above) or bespoke 
questionnaires designed for a specific sector e.g. healthcare (Jackson, Sarac [Agnew] & Flin 2010; 
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Waterson, 2015). To determine if safety culture has effect on safety behaviours and accidents, 
different types of outcome data can be collected, e.g. (i) near miss and accident incident records (ii) 
self-reports of incidents and injuries (iii) workers’ safety behaviours (self-reported or observed). 
The nuclear power industry has advocated the measurement and management of safety culture for 
30 years following the Chernobyl accident, and it provides guidance on performing safety culture 
assessments (IAEA, 2016). The focus of this report is on using such assessments as a learning 
opportunity for organizational growth and development rather than as a fault-finding or 'find and fix' 
exercise. The guidance advises having engagement with all levels of the organization and using 
techniques such as document reviews, questionnaires, interviews, observations and focus groups. It 
emphasises the need to use multiple measurements and qualitative, as well as quantitative methods, 
of gathering data. Similarly, the level of safety culture maturity can be assessed by questionnaires or 
card sorting and discussion tasks (see the Energy Institute, Hearts and Minds toolkit). Nowadays many 
oil and gas companies conduct regular safety culture surveys as part of their safety management 
system (e.g. Tharaldsen et al, 2008). 
 
Methods of measuring safety leadership 
Safety leadership is also usually measured by questionnaires, either completed by the leader and/or 
by those directly reporting to that leader. For example, Perceptions of supervisory behaviours for 
safety by Zohar and Luria (2005) was designed to identify how supervisors prioritise safety over 
productivity using self-report items in a questionnaire. There are standard leadership questionnaires 
which can be purchased from psychometric test suppliers, such as the Multifactor Leadership 
Questionnaire (MLQ) designed to assess transactional and transformational leadership (available from 
www.mindgarden.com). One method of assessing managers’ commitment to safety and safety 
behaviours, originally developed for the multinational company Shell, involves the leader completing 
a self-rating questionnaire and asking several of his or her team to complete an ‘upward’ rating 
(Bryden et al, 2006), which means that the staff rate their direct boss. These scores are fed back to 
each manager as a personal report and aggregated scores are presented for group discussion. (This is 
now part of the Energy Institute Hearts and Minds Toolkit).  
  
Methods of identifying and measuring non-technical skills 
While the main skill categories are similar across professions, the component elements and examples 
of good and poor behaviours need to be specified for a given profession and task set. Analysis of 
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incidents, interviews with experienced workers, as well as observation of behaviour during routine 
and non-routine work can reveal which workplace behaviours positively or negatively influence job 
performance and adverse events. These are all forms of task analysis (see Stanton et al, 2013) and 
where cognitive skills play a major part, e.g. control room operators, then cognitive task analysis can 
be used (Crandall et al, 2006). Having identified the skills and related behaviours, these need to be 
refined and organised into a concise, hierarchical structure or taxonomy. This is usually achieved using 
panels of subject matter experts. This skill set then forms the basis of NTS (CRM) training and related 
assessment methods (e.g. behaviour rating systems).   
Pilots are regularly assessed on their non-technical skills, using behaviour rating systems such as 
NOTECHS (CAA, 2016; Flin et al, 2003, Flin, 2019). In healthcare, the Anaesthetists’ Non-Technical Skills 
(ANTS) system was developed from data on anaesthetists’ behaviour gathered from a literature 
review, observations, interviews, surveys and incident analysis (Flin et al, 2010). There are also similar 
rating tools for surgeons (NOTSS) and for scrub nurses (SPLINTS) and anaesthetic assistants (ANTS-AP) 
- see Flin et al (2015). For papers and copies of these rating tools, see www.abdn.ac.uk/iprcs. 
APPLICATIONS 
Safety culture  
The main application of the safety culture concept has been in the use of diagnostic tools (described 
above) to measure the level of culture and identify strengths and weaknesses. For example, Agnew et 
al (2013) conducted a study of 1,866 healthcare staff to provide a baseline assessment of safety 
culture in Scottish hospitals. Their findings illustrated the links between safety perceptions and safety 
outcomes both for worker and patient injuries and focus groups with frontline staff were conducted 
to get a deeper understanding of the significant factors. More importantly, both the qualitative and 
the quantitative data were used as a tool to generate discussions with the management through an 
interactive workshop designed as a feedback mechanism (Agnew & Flin, 2014b). The main aim of the 
workshop was to discuss the project findings, present the available tools to assess safety culture and 
formulate recommendations for improving safety culture.  This was based on an approach devised in 
air traffic management (Kirwan, 2008; Mearns et al, 2013).  
Safety culture measurement can also be carried out across companies using a bench marking approach 
(Mearns et al 2001) so that organisations can learn from each other. Hudson (2007) discusses 
techniques that were used in a major operating company to enhance safety culture. The nuclear 
power industry (IAEA, 2016) recommends safety culture assessments as a learning opportunity for 
organizational development rather than as a fault-finding or 'find and fix' exercise.  
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Safety leadership training and non-technical skills training are both designed to shift the norms of 
behaviour, and thus drive the workplace culture in a safer direction.  
Safety leadership  
The main applications of safety leadership research are diagnostic tools to determine leadership style 
and training programmes for leaders. Part of the Hearts and Minds behavioural safety toolkit 
(mentioned above) is a training guide ‘Improving Supervision’ designed to provide a step by step guide 
to identify the areas of concerns with the supervisors’ leadership styles and the ways to improve 
people’s safety behaviours and performance (https://heartsandminds.energyinst.org/). Similarly, 
IOGP (2013) produced guidance for shaping the safety culture through effective safety leadership. 
Recently, there have been improved efforts to train leaders to manage safety in healthcare 
organisations. The World Health Organisation developed the Leadership Competencies Framework on 
Patient Safety and Quality of Care identifying the key leader competencies to ensure safe and quality 
patient care (www.who.int). In the USA, the Institute for Healthcare Improvement offers a programme 
called High Impact Leadership in order to help leaders to build safer healthcare organisations 
(Swensen, McMullen & Kabcenell, 2013).  
Non-technical skills  
Crew Resource Management training programmes to enhance non-technical skills are very well 
established in the aviation industry (CAA, 2016). Other sectors are beginning to adopt this method. It 
was recommended for offshore oil and gas production operations following the Piper Alpha accident 
(Flin, 1995) but was not endorsed until the Deepwater Horizon rig blowout 22 years later. Now, 
courses on Well Operations CRM (WOCRM) have been developed for rig crews (IOGP, 2014). Other 
sectors of the energy industry, such as refineries and pipelines, have been advised to adopt a CRM 
approach (Energy Institute, 2014). 
In healthcare, CRM is a recent innovation. Ab-initio courses in the medical and nursing schools are 
teaching students the importance of non-technical skills for patient safety. In some universities there 
are now psychologists employed to lecture on human factors and patient safety to healthcare 
students and these topics are being embedded throughout the curriculum. There are also courses on 
non-technical skills for qualified medical staff, such as surgeons (see Flin et al 2015).  
For recent guidance on the training and assessment of non-technical skills, see Thomas, 2017.  
Future Trends  
Product Safety Culture 
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New applications of safety culture have been emerging, relating to the safety of consumers rather 
than of workers. The concept of product safety culture has appeared in the manufacturing sector 
following a series of product failures that injured consumers, e.g. faults in cars, children’s toys, medical 
implants. Companies are now recognising that organisational culture may influence their design, 
manufacturing or service practices in ways that can ultimately affect the well-being of the product 
users. The empirical literature on this topic is, as yet limited, although there are studies of product 
safety culture in manufacturing (e.g. Zhu et al, 2016) and in the food industries, where the concept of 
food safety culture is now being discussed (e.g. Jesperson et al, 2016). At this stage it is unclear 
whether the components of the organisational safety culture that are protective for workers are the 
same as those that ensure the safety of consumers and product users (Suhanyiova et al, 2017).  
 
 Managers’ Safety Leadership 
Expressing some concerns about the limitations of a safety culture approach, Kirwan (2008), a senior 
psychologist at Eurocontrol, proposed that more attention needed to be paid to the knowledge and 
skills of senior managers in relation to organisational safety. He coined the term ‘safety intelligence’ 
and subsequently sponsored research to explore the concept (Fruhen et al, 2014a). A resulting White 
Paper (Eurocontrol, 2013) explains how senior managers can become more intelligent safety leaders.   
A related approach has been to examine ‘chronic unease’ in senior managers. This concept first 
appeared in the high reliability literature and refers to managers retaining sufficient level of concern 
about the safety of their work sites and not being complacent about ever-present risks. Fruhen et al 
(2014b, 2016) identified five key attributes of chronic unease: Pessimism, propensity to worry, 
vigilance, requisite imagination and flexible thinking. Interviews with senior managers from oil and gas 
companies found that chronic unease was described as having positive effects on safety.   
Non-Technical Skills and the Safety Management System 
The aviation industry continues to review its CRM (NTS) training and evaluation and recent guidance 
from the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA, 2015) emphasises that the CRM methods should be 
evidence-based and embedded within the organisation’s safety management system, for example by 
using safety data to inform CRM training requirements. A new component that should be included in 
pilots’ CRM training is the effects of a startle response which can occur after a sudden ‘threat’ in the 
environment and cause a loss of concentration. This was recommended following the findings of the 
investigation report into the Air France (AF447) fatal accident in 2009 when the pilots lost control of 
a large passenger aircraft flying between Rio and Paris (BEA, 2012).  
16 
  
Conclusion 
Organisations striving to improve their safety performance need to adopt a wide ranging human 
factors/ergonomics approach. This chapter focused on psychological research on workplace safety 
culture and associated safety behaviours, describing human factors measurement tools and training 
techniques, applied in healthcare and the oil and gas industry. These are being used to measure safety 
culture and to address two key aspects of behaviour that influence the culture, namely managers’ 
safety leadership and workers’ non-technical skills.  
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